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Lisa T. Sarasohn, Gassendi's Ethics: Freedom in a
Mechanistic Universe. Ithaca^: Cornell University Press,
1996. Pp. xii + 236. $45.
Reviewed by Peter S. Fosl, Transylvania University
/

he work of the French Catholic priest, Pierre Gassendi
(1592-1655), has commonly been read—when read at all—as
a set of influential early modern texts remarkable for having
developed a materialistic and mechanistic rendering of the
non-human natural world in service to what was to become modern empirical
science. An agent of neo-Epicurean atomism, Gassendi is commonly situated
alongside of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), with whom through the intercession of Marin
Mersenne (1588-1648) Gassendi engaged in 1641 and 1642 in a well known
dispute concerning Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
Gassendi has been regarded as important for developing a systematic
reworking of the Epicurean view that the universe is composed strictly of
material particles, in his case solid atoms of different size and shape which
combine with each other according to regular and inviolable natural laws. Such
a view of the world provides an account of nature's workings without appeal
to immaterial substances such as the substantial "forms" of Aristotelians and
Platonists. In its most extreme cases—though not in Gassendi's—it abjures the
presence of soul, spirit, mind, and God altogether. Gassendi's attack on
immaterialism can be traced at least to his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus
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Aristoteleos, published in 1624 Just one year after Galileo's Assayer, a text which,
like Gassendi's later work, also advocated materialistic atomism.
Gassendi seems to have commenced his study of Epicurean atomism
around 1628 or 1629, perhaps through the influence of the Dutch atomist Isaac
Beckman. Gassendi's Epicurean studies came to fruition in his Syntagma
Philosophicum, a work published in 1658, three years after his death, though
upon which he had been working for decades. Along with detailed elaboration
of physical, metaphysical, epistemological, and theological topics in the
Syntagma, there are as well portions of the text devoted to ethics—written,
Sarasohn claims, after 1641. These passages, however, have been interpreted by
most commentatorsas derivative recapitulationsof ancient Epicureanism which
function as little more than ancillary appendages to the main thrust of the text.
In Lisa Sarasohn's view, theseinterpreters have it backwards. Responding
to Margaret Osier, Lynn Joy, Howard Egan, et ah, Sarasohn maintains in the
primary historiographic task of her book, that Gassendi is principally an ethical
thinker, a thinker whose work on metaphysics and epistemology sustains his
ethical objective of describing the world humans inhabit so that we might
understand ourselves as thoroughly free beings. Is she successful in this?
Partially. Sarasohn's thesis carries significant explanatory power. It shows how
Gassendi's work may be read as a philosophically coherent whole rather than
simply as a compilation of texts joined haphazardly. It is, says Sarasohn, for the
sake of freedom that Gassendi articulates a materialistic atomism that eschews
the limiting effects of essences, natures, forms, and local teleologies; for if
essences are permitted, then we act out of our natures and not our unrestricted
freedom. It is for the sake of freedom that Gassendi attacks astrology; for if the
stars determine our destiny, then we are not free. It is for the sake of freedom
that Gassendi develops a probabilistic epistemology; for if we can know the
truth with absolute certainty, then we will not be faced with a set of viable
alternatives among which we can exercise our freedom. Sarasohn skillfully
shows how Gassendi deployed elements from the skeptical and rhetorical
traditions in developing these claims.
Sarasohn's thesis is particularly enlightening in showing how Gassendi's
attacks on Descanes can be understood as motivated by ethical rather than
(only) epistemological concerns. (She might have also, I think, compared
Gassendi as Epicurean with Descartes as Stoic.) Sarasohn claims that Gassendi's
criticisms of Descartes's doctrine of clear and distinct ideas and theory of error
plays out a then current contest between the followers of Guillaume Gihieuf
(1591-1650) (who like Augustinians, Jansenists, and Calvinists advanced the
notion that the will is corrupt) and those following Luis de Molina (1535-1600)
(who held that the will is purely indifferent and free in its choice making).
Gassendi, according to Sarasohn, saw Descartes's view as in line with Gibeuf
and doubly threatening to human freedom: first, because of its flawed view of
the will and, second, because of its claim to having achieved certain truth. Only
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an epistemologically limited mind, utterly indifferent to the possible choices
presented to it, can be rightly understood as free.
Sarasohn's thesis, then, explains why Gassendi devoted so much energy
to Descartes's "Fourth Meditation," the Meditation concerned with thewill and
with error, rather than others. Still her exposition is weakened by its over
reliance upon secondary sources—a flaw which pervades the book. In the
sections contrasting Descartes and Gassendi, almost no quotations from the
relevant texts are presented. Her renderings of other figures are no better
supported. In learning what "Saint Augustine had taught" (79 n.l4), for
example, we are presented not with his own words but with those of a
commentator—and a commentator writing not on Augustine but on Pascal.
This in a passage which peculiarly attributes to Augustine "causal determinism."
Moreover, while Sarasohn's thesis is powerful and a valuable contribution to
the literature on Gassendi, it is I think not powerful enough to demonstrate
that Gassendi's interest in ethics supersedes his interest in metaphysics and
physics. To show that Gassendi's ethical project is central to his work is not
to show that it is primary.
Sarasohn undertakes a number of other historiographic projects in her
book, most notably attempting to show that the "relationship" between
Hobbes and Gassendi was "far more interdependent that scholars have generally
realized" and that Gassendi was an important influence upon Locke. In both
cases, however, her evidence is extremely circumstantial. Gassendi's influence
upon Hobbes largely hangs upon the unknown extent to which Mersenne
communicated Gassendi's work to Hobbes and to a few similar metaphors in
each author's texts. Gassendi's influence upon Locke is held to follow through
the possible influence upon Locke of one of Gassendi's British promoters,
Francois Bernier, and a number of other suggestive circumstances. Her
historical work in these investigations is interesting and serves to disclose
important and suggestive elements of the intellectual milieu in which these
thinkers worked. Her conclusions, however, overstep the evidence. Suggestion
falls far short of demonstration.
Sarasohn also advances a philosophical proposal, namely that Gassendi's
stature as an ethicist has been underappreciated and that his work is of sufficient
quality and sophistication to merit substantially more attention by ethicists (3).
Here too Sarasohn presents an unfulfilled promise, for Gassendi's Ethics is a
work of intellectual history, not philosophy proper. Her text does show that
Gassendi did more than simply recapitulate Epicurus. His rendering of
pleasure, we discover, is more nuanced than the ancient's; his faculty psychol
ogy is distinct and a genuine innovation over Molina's; his views of ethics,
metaphysics, and theology is—contrary to some critics—consistently integrated.
These are conclusions that whet the appetite and certainly portray Gassendi as
a more interesting figure than readers have generally encountered, but they are
also consistent with a view of Gassendi's work as sophisticated though
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nevertheless derivative elaboration. Persuading scholars of the period that it is
more than that will require more careful and comprehensive textual analysis
and argument than this text provides.

J. Douglas Canfield, Tricksters and Estates: On the
Ideology of Restoration Comedy. Lexington: The Univer
sity Press of Kentucky, 1997. Pp. xi -f- 315. $44.95.
Reviewed by Scott Hall Gordon, Lehigh University
Douglas Canfield depicts Restoration comedy as largely complicit with the
official discourse of the Restoration State, managing and celebrating the
transmission of "estates" (often collapsed into the women who embody them)
into proper aristocratic hands. Repeatedly these plays show "the necessity for
couples with the right stuff—both nobility and energy—to be the proper
vehicles for the transmission of power and property through patrilinearity"
(73). Restoration comedies perform this "cultural work,"as Canfield shows, by
socializing the "energy" (a favored term in this study) of figures potentially
transgressive; the Restoration "trickster," for instance, who threatens the
transmission of estates by a sexual freedom that could lead less to "genealogical
control" than to "jumbled genealogy" (19,16), typically ends up socialized into
marriage. This is not, of course, the only trajectory visible in Restoration
comedy, and Canfield subtly and intelligently analyzes the forces in these
comedies that challenge this dominant ideology. Subversive ideas—which
expose the suspicion that sexual tricksters have "scramble[d] the genealogy that
the entire system of property exchange through marriage was designed to
protect" (121), or which imply that Stuart legitimacy is "based upon mere will
to power" and that "right no longer makes might; might makes right" (1,
243)—do persevere in several plays. Although most often, Canfield argues, the
"centrifugal energy" of these implicit threats are "centripetalized" by means of
marriage, certain plays refuse this containment.
Tricksters and Estates summarizes, quite wittily, the plots of a wide range
of Restoration comedies, refusing to limit its attention to the "Big Three" of
Wycherley, Congreve, andEtherege, and tests each play against the standard of
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dominant Stuart ideology as described in two texts, Christopher Hill's The
Century of Revolution, 1603-1714 (New York: Norton, 1961) and Raymond
Williams's The Country and the City (New York: Oxford University Press,
1973). Canfield places each play in one of three genres, defined by ideological
stance rather than formal features: social comedies"underwrite Stuart ideology"
by "socializ[ing] threats to the dominant aristocracy and reaffirm[ing] its
patriarchal order" (6, 31), subversive comedies "undercut it" by focusing on
"manifestations of centrifugal energy" such as rivalry within the ruling class,
rebellious upper-class women, and democratic elements (6, 121), and comical
satires "challenge it as fundamentally immoral or amoral" by "eschew[ing] any
concluding embrace or celebration and substitut[ing] the whip of the moralist"
(6,210). Canfield's use of genre, admirably, never seems like pigeonholing. He
shows that these plays perform different sorts of cultural work, and his study
uses the work each play does to locate it generically. The generic marker, then,
serves (as Canfield suggests in his introduction [6]) less to describe what a play
"is" than what it "does."
In another sense, however, Canfield does treat each play as if it "is"
something essential, in that he represents plays, generally, as unified structures.
While Canfield's study subtly portrays the many different attitudes these plays
take to the dominant Stuart ideology, these differences tend for him to occur
between plays rather than within plays. And those plays that do manifest forces
that pull in different directions ("centripetal" vs. "centrifugal") nevertheless
seem to resolve themselves firmly enough in one direction or another for
Canfield to confidently ascribe to each an ideology and therefore to place it
generically. But how do critics assess the relationship between a play's
contradictory elements.^ Tricksters and Estates provokes this question without
resolving it satisfactorily; perhaps the question is unresolvable. Canfield
explicitly relies heavily on each play's "sense of an ending" (63) to resolve this
difficulty: the "question whether a comic play with satiric elements remains a
comedy or becomes a satire per se, however, depends entirely on the ending"
(210). This is a tidy, but questionable, interpretive assumption.
An alternative approach to deal with the question of how we analyze a
play whose ideology seems contradictory, however, might resist the urge to
construe each play as unified. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield propose
that "strategies of containment presuppose centrifugal tendencies, and how far
any particular instance carries conviction cannot be resolved by literary
criticism." "The question of conviction," they add, "is finally a question about
the diverse conditions of reception" ("History and Ideology: The Instance of
Henry V," in John Drakakis, ed., Alternative Shakespeares, 225). At times, it is
true, Canfield does suggest that an audience might "suffer ambivalen[t]"
responses to certain plays (128-29). But in addition to the possibility that an
audience may register multiple messages from a play, it is also possible that
different segments of the audience may register as significant different aspects of
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a play. The "sense of an ending," even if it consolidates the "patriarchal,
patrilineal genealogical power structure of inheritance" (3), may be incapable
of preventing engaged groups from focusing on aspects of a play that Canfield
confidently describes as contained. Canfield asserts that Restoration play
wrights simultaneously "stimulated their audiences with...implicit threats to
ruling class ideology" and made "the threats disappear when the women marry
men with not only the right stuff but the right class credentials" (67). But the
word "stimulated" (like other words he often deploys, such as "energy") enables
Canfield to avoid a more precise articulation (or defense) of how spectators
might react: is stimulation merely transitory pleasure or can it lead to
subversive insight.' Can certain spectators, perhaps those ideologically
"situated" to do so, take the "implicit threats" seriously and ignore the "sense
of the ending"? This study hides these questions, in part, by treating the
audience as homogeneous, as if all observers received each play identically. But
if its structural commitment to divide Restoration comedies according to how
each reinforces or challenges the dominant Stuart ideology leads this study to
neglect the possibility that these plays' ambivalences may have enabled them to
be used diversely by the diverse audiences who watched them. Tricksters and
Estates offers an admirably focused argument showing that all Restoration
comedy, whether now forgotten or famous, struggled over the "contested
ground" of the early modern "estate" (8).

Katharine M. Quinsey, ed., Broken Boundaries: Women
and Feminism in Restoration Drama. Lexington: Univer
sity Press of Kentucky, 1996. Pp. 244. $39.95.
Reviewed by Jeslyn Medojf, University of Massachusetts,
Boston
Broken Boundaries is a welcome collection of scholarly essays and fascinating
illustrations that will surely enrich our understanding of late seventeenthcentury theater. It makes perfect sense that we have at last a series of essays
dealing with issues of gender and feminist inquiry on the subject since, as the
editor notes, "Restoration drama is overwhelmingly concerned with questions
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of gender identity, sexuality, and women's oppression" and is distinguished as
"perhaps the most telling popular expression" in its time of "radical questions"
about the nature and relations of women and men (1-2). Many will consider
this assembly of studies long overdue, and be impressed by its ambitions, given
that most examinations of gender, feminist issues, and women's writing of this
period have concentrated primarily on fiction. Acknowledging both the
"valuable revisionist historical work" of recent studies on women's participa
tion in the theatrical world, and the influence of current theoretical treatments
of gender, politics, and discourse in this period, the editor aims to carry this
work further by focussing on "specifically feminist issues" that occur in period
texts and productions by both male and female playwrights in order to "help
revise current historical and theoretical understanding of both Restoration
discourse and . . . society" (3). The collection's intentions are not unrealistic;
it will undoubtedly receive serious consideration, and will encourage further
studies of the "constructions of sexuality and gender" that mark the period's
"ideological shifts" and remain with us today (9).
Because of its wide scope. Broken Boundaries unites a rather diverse
assembly of a dozen studies under three banners: plays by women, plays by
men, and the theory and history of performance. In the section on women
playwrights we find, as might be expected, a focus on Aphra Behn, with essays
on Behn's comedies by Dagney Boebel, Peggy Thompson, and Robert
Erickson. Two other essays in this section, by Jacqueline Pearson and Rebecca
Merrens, bring long-needed critical attention to the plays of Behn's successors,
the oft-parodied "Female Wits," Mary Pix, Delariviere Manley, and Catherine
Trotter. The essays on male playwrights include J. Douglas Canfield on citcuckolding as class warfare in Exclusion Crisis comedies by Ravenscroft,
D'Urfey, and Crowne (with a nod to Behn's The Roundheads), Katherine
Quinsey on feminine will and identity in The Conquest of Granada, an
examination by James E. Evans of the ways in which "the story of subjection
found in the sexual contract" is presented in The Way of the World and The
Beaux' Stratagem (161), and Pat Gill's reading of The Way of the World as
representative of "the paradoxical demands made on female characters by
playwrights of manners comedy" (177). The collection's third and final section
contains two essays addressing rape scenes and the position of the female
spectator, Jean Marsden's "Rape, Voyeurism, and the Restoration Stage" and
Laura Rosenthal's article on the actress and the spectatrix in Restoration
Shakespeare, as well as the final essay, Cynthia Lowenthal's study of the effect
of essentializing discourses on Restoration actresses.
As in many anthologies, the division of essays into sections according to
general topic underplays significant undercurrents and thematic connections
that run throughout the collection as a whole. Reading Dagney Boebel's "In
the Carnival World of Adam's Garden: Roving and Rape in Behn's Rover,"
which appears in part one, alongside Jean Marsden's essay on rape in part three.
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provides an informative contrast in scholarly approaches and critical language.
Boebel's essay examines a single Behn play with a heavy reliance on theory,
citing Bakhtin's observations on the "radically dehierarchizing effect" of
carnival (55) and invokingGayatri Spivak in order to assert that "Behn dissolves
binarily structured discourse, effecting such chaos through liberative disguise
in the form of carnivalesque circumstance and subverted political phallicism"
(54). For this reader, the most worthwhile contributions of the essay were
those noting the contrasts between the inversions and displacements in the
speech of the female characters, and the observation that The Rover opens and
closes with a brother (Don Pedro) threatening his sister (Florinda) with
"different aspects of the same arbitrary patriarchal domination," enforced
marriage and incestuous rape (67). Marsden's essay, informed but not
overtaken by gender studies and feminist film theory, connects a "new emphasis
on the representation of rape" with the "new climate for sexual display" caused
by the advent of actresses on the stage, and opens by conflating the "desire" of
the stage rapist with the "implicit [desire] in the audience's gaze" (185-86).
After examining rape scenes in plays by Brady, D'Urfey, Tate, Behn [TheRover
and The Lucky Chance) and others, and declaring that they "represented an
erotic fantasy to be vicariously experienced through the act of voyeurism"
(187), Marsden differentiates the experiences of female and male audience
members by usefully employing the work of Mulvey, Doane, and de Lauretis,
and concludes that "the female spectator, like the heroine she watches, finds
gender lines firmly drawn between those who rape and those who are raped,
the actor and the acted upon. Stylized, choreographed, and histrionic, rape still
generates a cycle of victimization even when its participants are fictional and its
scope contained by theater walls" (197).
Many of the essays work as complements or contrasts to each other,
stretching, if not breaking, the boundaries among each. Thompson's study of
closure and subversion in The Rover and other Behn comedies, for example,
touches on the near-rapes of Florinda that Marsden and Boebel discuss in more
detail, while the focus of Laura Rosenthal's essay allows more careful examina
tions of the rape scenes in Tate's adaptations of King Lear and Coriolanus than
does that of Marsden's essay, which grants them a paragraph or two.
Thompson's and Erickson's essays contrast in the degree to which Behn's
female characters are seen as successfully challenging the patriarchy and
highlighting "the social and economic forces that allow no alternatives [to]
sexual and biological definition" (85). In turn, the two essays together provide
a counterpoint to Evans' reading of Millimant's, Dorinda's, and Mrs. Fainall's
"resistance to private tyranny" as the basis of the "comic faith" of their plays'
endings (161).
The most worthwhile essays are those that combine traditional literary
historical practice with newer theoretical approaches. Canfield, for example,
persuasively places a number of comedies within the context of their political
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moment (the Exclusion crisis) in order to argue that cit-cuckolding serves as a
"trope" for class and gender dominance. In particular, Pearson's essay,
"Blacker Than Hell Creates: Fix rewrites Othello," undertakes the kind of
scholarly endeavor that would seem to be an obvious starting point for current
feminist scholarship, but is all too often neglected. Recent critical studies are
often marred by their unwillingness or inability todiscuss the poems, plays, and
fiction of women writers for what they are: adaptations, revisions, paraphrases,
translations. Pearson grounds her claims for Fix's contributions by comparing
her plays to their sources, thereby highlighting Fix's innovations, just asshe has
done elsewhere for Jane Barker's early-eighteenth-century fiction and other
literature of the period. The illuminating nature of Pearson's comparative
work attests to the urgent need for such literary historical grounding in the
study of early women's writing. Pearson significantly increases our understand
ing of women's contributions to Restoration and post-Restoration theater with
the important observation that both Fix and Behn "ransacked the canon of pre1660 plays" to revise "those that concentrate on images of ethnic otherness,"
noting here, for the first time, that such revisions form "a significant element
in the corpus of women's drama from the mid-1670s to about 1705," in a way
that does not apply to the work of male playwrights (15). In conducting such
comparisons, Pearson reveals that Fix, like Behn, employs ethnic difference "to
figure gender difference" and "subvertjs] binary oppositions with vigor but also
with an extraordinary intertextual subtlety" (16), and finds that women authors
"tend to carry further [Shakespeare's] problematization of stereotypes of
difference" (17). All readers may not accept unconditionally her contention
that Shakespeare"falls back into an essentialist, biology-is-destiny view" of race
and gender in the fifth act of Othello (17), nor will everyone be convinced by
her claim that Behn's and Fix's challenges to prevailing racial stereotypes
functioned as an "enabling mechanism" for the emergence of eighteenth-century
women into the public discourse of the antislavery movement (16). However,
Pearson's thesis that Fix's tragedies conduct a "serious interrogation of
hierarchies of gender and class through the image of ethnicity" (29) seems solid
and makes one wonder what conclusions might be drawn from Fix's Queen
Catharine (1698), which re-envisions the French-speaking virgin in Shake
speare's Henry V.
Despite the interplay among essays noted above, seemingly obvious
connections between contributions that should occur are not always made.
One author's claim that Behn's was the "only evidence of a seventeenth-century
woman's response tothe dramatic representation of rape" (196) ignores the rape
or near-rape scenes in plays by Behn's successors, Delariviere Manley and Mary
Fix, a particularly distressing omission since Pearson briefly discusses Fix's
treatment of the subject (23) and has considered these scenes in her ground
breaking study. The Prostituted Muse: Images of Women and Women Dramatists
1642-1737. There are other problems in the collection, but it must be said that
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they can be found generally in recent scholarship, and are not particular to
feminist studies or to this work alone. Because the work of women writers has
received far more critical and theoretical attention than actual careful textual
editing, critics often employ twentieth-century anthologies and non-facsimile
reprints as copy texts. As a result, earlier errors in transcription are carried on.
Unfortunately, this problem has occurred in this collection. It appears that
Robert Erickson is the only scholar who has corrected his quotations against
first editions. In view of the fact that first editions are now widely available in
microfiche and microfilm series like Early English Books and The Eighteenth
Century, there would seem to be little excuse for a scholar in any school of
criticism to settle for an unreliable text. In another case, also not peculiar to
this collection, a very brief quotation from an acknowledged secondary source
is not encased in quotation marks, and reads as if it were the writing of the
essayist. Errors aside, readers will find in Broken Boundaries observations on
the nature of late-seventeenth-century English art and society that are well
worth their time and consideration.

Rose A. Zimbardo, At Zero Point: Discourse, Culture, and
Satire in Restoration England. Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1998. Pp. x + 203. $34.95.
Reviewed hy Ehen Wood, University of Michigan
In the acknowledgments that preface her study of the "epistemological shift"
by which early-modern, semiotically self-reflexive signifying practices become
incipiently modern and mimetic. Rose Zimbardo reflects on a long career
dedicated to eighteenth century studies. She has, she writes, "discovered that
a human life is 'a dance to the music of time,' and that the music is a madrigal.
One returns again and again to a theme" (ix). This genetic line of reasoning
comes to frame her entire study, as Zimbardo constructs the heuristic fiction
of a Restoration "zero point" at which the difference separating two radically
opposed epistemes is manifest. The post-structuralist locus classicus of such an
observation is Foucault's The Order of Things, which together with The
Archaeology of Knowledge defines Foucault's methodological examination of
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epistemological transformations. This archaeological approach emphasizes the
relationship between complex contextual systems, through which objects or
things are produced in historically specific ways, and the unstable excess that
those objects represent for any system's signifying function. The dialectic was
once a way of understanding this relationship; increasingly, new vocabularies
are developing along the fecund intersections of biology, physics, history, and
philosophy. Zimbardo has chosen to situate her study implicitly in this
charged theoretical zone as a way of seeking new insight into the shift from
late-Renaissance forms of "deconstmctive" Juvenalian satire to the increasingly
Horatian models of the post-Restoration period.
Zimbardo defines her "zero point" by quoting from Hans Blumenberg's
The Legitimacy of the Modem Age: "'The zero point of dissolution of order and
the point of departure of the constmction of order are identical; the minimum
of ontological predisposition is at the same time the maximum of constructive
potentiality'" (2). Following Blumenberg, Zimbardo has "named as 'zero point'
the moment in late seventeenth-century English culture wherein medi
eval/Renaissance epistemology collapsed under the weight of questions it had
itself raised and simultaneously the new epistemology of modernism was
constructed" (22). For all the far-reaching implications of this concept for a
study of historical and cultural change, Zimbardo seems primarily interested in
invoking it as a means of closing down contemporary theoretical questions: "I
have deliberately chosen not to engage in discussion or debate with my
contemporaries.... My conversation is with the past" (7). She endeavors to
utilize what she describes repeatedly as "deconstructive" (3) procedures and
terminology without engaging the complex theoretical explication necessitated
by their use. While her effort to avoid tired post-modernist versus New
Critical or structuralist polemics is understandable, it is frustrating to have the
work of so many contemporary theorists and critics hinted at (often positively)
without having Zimbardo's interest in their work or its relevance to her
"theme" more fully explored.
Zimbardo begins with a general consideration of the problems of logic,
language and referentiality on which her epistemic shift is predicated, playing
the sixteenth-century language-constituted logic of Ralph Lever and Thomas
Wilson against the seventeenth-century mimetic logic of Robert Sanderson, a
follower of Ramus and author of the frequently reprinted Logicae Artis
Compendium (1615), as well as against the natural philosophy (and its secular
history) of Bacon, Benjamin Sprat, and Robert Boyle. The restricted forms of
knowledge posed as universal and absolute by both groups of thinkers are
exposed, in Zimbardo's argument, by the deconstructive instability of works
like the anonymous 1683 satire The Whores Rhetorick or Rochester's earlier "A
Ramble in St. James's Park." An "imitation" of Ferrante Pallavicino's 1642
satire La Retorica delle Putane, which along with other anticlerical writings
contributed to Pallavicino's execution for heresy in 1644, The Whores Rhetorick

360

1650-1850

shadows traditional social satire, including the typical pedagogical structure of
a rhetoric textbook, as a means of producing a critique of rhetorical and logical
systems as such. As Zimbardo notes, the satire cuts both ways, mocking
Ramist logic as "sheer sophistry" while poking fun "at the alarms and anxieties
of the new thinker's distrust of 'false and deceitful Syllogisms'" (37). Equally
satirized are traditional rhetorical tropes, such as the referencing of classical
authors, and the increasingly stable and psychologized narrative subject that
reflects and reinforces the Cartesian opposition of self and world. The text
somehow becomes the artifact of an unexplicated process of intentionality. In
its formal attributes, Zimbardo argues. The Whores Rhetorick exposes the
historical "truth" of semiotic contingency, a contingency that threatens the
mimetic positivism of modernity's emerging discourse of naturalism. "A
Ramble in St. James's Park," by shadowing Edmund Waller's 1661 "On St.
James's Park, as Lately Improved by His Majesty," performs the same kind of
deconstructive function. Once again, however, the difficulty lies in Zimbardo's
reluctance to explicate more fully the theoretical foundations of such an
observation.
Zimbardo's study progresses through readings of Oldham's "Aude ahquid.
Ode" [Satire Against Virtue], Wycherley's The Plain Dealer, and Swift's Tale of
a Tub, considering the figure of the wit or libertine as a literary/rhetorical trope
by which the fiction of the stable narrative subject is questioned. In her view,
the libertine is the deconstructive
par excellence, as he does not represent
a coherent psychological entity, but a set of literary conventions that under
mine both rationalist and materialist assumptions. As one might expect,
Zimbardo views the libertine against the larger context of the Restoration's
rapidly transforming notions of sexuality by examining homoeroticism in such
texts as Rochester's "Disabled Debauchee" and the plays of Aphra Behn.
Drawing heavily on the work of Jonathan Dollimore, among others, Zimbardo
links increasingly binary sexual coding to the rise of systems of production
(both material and ideological) throughout the "long eighteenth century"
(1680-1830). Her frequent references to economist Charles Davenant's An
Essay upon the Probable Methods of making a People Gainers in the Ballance of
Trade (1699), an essay representative of Davenant's contributions to the Board
of Trade in which Locke also played a significant developmental role, anchor
her discussion in developing mercantile ideologies while begging the obvious
question of how Davenant's Whiggishly "modernist" economic thought relates
to the work of his father, noted libertine, playwright, and Restoration poet
laureate William Davenant. This critique of cultural and historical production
is extended to an explication of Dryden's role in stabilizing and codifying the
theory of satire (particularly in his 1695 A Discourse Concerning the Original
and Progress of Satire), to the eighteenth century's production of a literary
history that posits Pope as the telos of satiric development, and to the rise of
new narrative forms, particularly the novel, that have shaped our reading of
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satire ever since. Finally, Zimbardo follows Edward Said's early Orientalism
in explicating the prevalence of Asian settings and characterson the Restoration
stage, seeing in these settings and characters the production of oppositional
typologies of self and other that will prove useful to England's developing
national and colonial identities.
Illuminating as these observations might be for individual examples of
satire, Zimbardo does little to explore how broad historical changein signifying
practices or forces of ideological production are effected or, indeed, how such
practices actually function across a range of disparate and distinct literary
artifacts. At Zero Point raises many questions about the relationship between
the literatures of the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries and about the
ontological status of language generally. At the same time, however, it leaves
too many of these questions unresolved in an apparent desire to see language as
the shifting mask of an ahistorical, omnipresent "abyss" that remains undefined
and beyond the reach of investigation. Heuristic fictions proliferate, from the
"zero point" itself to the very notion that such a thing as a "deconstructionist"
(15, 23, 43) exists, while they are left to be taken at face value. The framing
fiction of life as a madrigal illustrates the conceptual difficulties of working in
an innovative fashion without a careful grounding of foundational concepts.
The metaphoric or pictorial gesture is ultimately, as both Swift and Wittgen
stein differently remind us, both insufficient and too much at once.

*

Jayne Elizabeth Lewis, The English Fable: Aesop and
Literary Culture, 1651-1740. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996. Pp. x + 234. $57.95.
Reviewed by Yvonne Noble, Canterbury, England
The Fables of John Gay was one of the most frequently reprinted works of
literature in English for a hundred and fifty years, yet it has received virtually
no attention in print from literary critics. The fables of Anne Finch, so
vigorously imagined, by contrast fell into oblivion, through the forces that
operate upon women's writing; now that interest has returned to Finch,
reciprocal forces draw critics primarily to her other poems that seem more
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overtly to express her personal situation, her friendships and loyalties. We
therefore welcome Jayne Lewis's fine study, which offers us a chapter of
insightful critical attention to the neglected fables of each of these poets,
following a strong, valuable study of fables in English of the seventeenth
century.
In the earlier period, Lewis's book is a useful complement to Annabel
Patterson's study of many of the same materials in her Fables of Power, where
the concern is primarily with fables' use in debate about constitutional
arrangements at a time of political repression and censorship. Lewis, partly
through noticing that the fable begins to be presented customarily with
pictorial illustrations, explores the differing legibilities of fables in the two
media, as the tales' abstract moral potential becomes grounded in material
particularity. At the same time, she is interested in fables' use as an enabling
genre by individuals.
Lewis's early chapters deal with the English Aesop, not only with the
traditional fables, as Englished from John Ogilby onwards, but also with the
received "Life of Aesop" that customarily accompanied these texts, and with
these as a site of conflict in late-century scholarship. (After Bentley, we should
speak of "Aesop"—an author-function.) In the received "Life" Aesop begins as
a slave, a hunchback, an Ethiop, a mute—overdetermined as an "Other." He
first achieves mastery over language, and over situations, by commanding
material signs, as,for example, in the case of the punning tongue-meat he cooks
and serves up for dinner. Lewis is good at noticing the use of such signs right
through the period she studies, right down to the sheepskin being flayed and
nailed up on a tree in Gay's fable of the bull and the ram. Such signs, with the
beast fable that contain them, are for Lewis sites mediating and in some sense
reconciling conflicts of opinion.
As with this fable, Lewis is most interested in the moment of reading in
The Hind and the Panther. Dramatizing issues that they have debated concern
ing the nature of the meaning in the visible sign of the eucharistic host and the
words "This is my body," the hind's and panther's tellings of beast fables
demonstrates the claiming of authority to deploy and to interpret meaningful
signs. Lewis's discussion offers helpful new insights into this artful poem, so
resistant to giving up its secrets.
With Finch, Lewis is acute in showing how this writer can appropriate La
Fontaine's authority to express a different moral outlook and a different gender
experience. More could have been made, I think, of Finch's use of these fables
to express her contempt for the new commercial culture that was continuing
to marginalize Jacobite loyalists and rural aristocrats, like her husband and
herself. Lewis is deflected here by her reading of the meaning of the publication
of Miscellany Poems, which she interprets as the sign of Finch's successful
entrance into the new print culture. Charles Hinnant reads the same
publication as a sign of failure, and he points out that Finch remained in the old

Book Reviews

363

private manuscript culture of the period in which she began—most of her work
is transmitted to us in this way (and we still await publication of much of it,
certainly in un-self-censored form). The conflict of Lewis's and Hinnant's
readings could be resolved by "reading" the books as material signs like Gay's
sheepskin—does the paper, do the running heads, press numbers, and so on, tell
us that the differences between copies represent success, in the form of
additional printings ("editions," as Lewis calls them), or failure, in the form of
attempts to disguise unsold stock with new title-pages? Finch's name on the
title page of the late issues would in the latter case represent a sign of anguish,
of her being forced to give up her cherished privacy to enable a bookseller to
rid himself of undesired wares.
Now that Lewis hasso happily brought Finch's and Gay's fables back into
view in the context of the moment of transition from the manu
script/patronage culture to the new print marketplace, the way is open for
further study of them in at least two interesting respects. First, one would like
to know more of what is signified commercially by the presence of illustrations.
With Gay's first series (with Francis Barlow's, too, judging by Janet Todd's
description of his Aesop in the poetry volume of her new edition of Aphra
Behn) the letterpress verbal fables appear on the same pages as the engraved
illustrations. This means that those pages had to be printed twice per side, on
two different kinds of press. Why was this complicated method chosen? Gay's
second series, for example, followed the simpler method of having the
illustrations printed separately and leaving the complication (interleaving) to
the binder. Why were illustrations thought to be so essential? Was the extra
printing cost and all the possible wastage through bad register and wrong
placement (visible in some copies) still offset by the savings in the costs of
copper and of the engraver's time?
Secondly, to what degree could Finch and Gay be using La Fontaine as a
personal model, in his personal circumstances, in his ambivalence that found
outlet in the fable form, in his situation at a real moment of transition—with
the fall of Foucquet—between the old patronage and modern print culture?
Like Gay, he bids both towards Court patronage in his dedications to royal
princes and at the same time towards the market by his elaborate, illustrated
published format. Both men focus their dissatisfaction upon court ministers;
both drift to epistolary satire in their later series. Finch's situation as someone
suffering in remaining loyal to a fallen patron echoes La Fontaine's. She could
easily have heard details of his life through their overlapping circles of
acquaintance and studied his poetry for strategies of political indirection. His
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fables contain more topical meaning than is generally supposed; hers may as
well, if examined in this way.

*

Howard Erskine-Hill, Poetry of Opposition and Revolu
tion: Dryden to Wordsworth. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996. Pp. xii + 272. $68
Reviewed by Simon Varey, University of California, Los
Angeles.
We underestimate at our peril the fears and uncertainties in British minds on
both sides of the issue of dynastic succession during the troubled reign of James
II, the last days of Queen Anne's, or the Jacobite Rebellion, the '45. Even the
most pragmatic of politicians, Robert Walpole, spent mountains of money and
energy organizing anti-Jacobite witch-hunts, rooting out printers, and taming
the press. Lord Hervey's memoirs, unpublished at the time, "never make light
of the Jacobite threat" (142). While historians resistant to revisionism dismiss
the Jacobite movement as insignificant or exaggerated, and note that few
Jacobites took arms for Prince Charles, Mark Akenside in 1747 made the
point—often ignored in discussions of the '45—"that few Hanoverians rose in
arms for King George" (147).
Jacobites roaringtheir opinions on hereditary right usually got themselves
in trouble. In 1713, Hilkiah Bedford took the punishment for a pamphlet
(although he had not written it) suggesting that the revolution was not all that
glorious. The poor fellow was fined heavily, given a lengthy prison term, and
required to find four sureties totaling £5,000 for good behavior for life. One
way to avoid such draconian punishments was to write in language that was
more suggestive and less defiant. Dozens of now forgotten pamphleteers
adopted this tactic but, as Mr. Erskine-Hill shows, so did the biggest guns
among the poets.
Mr. Erskine-Hill's eloquent study begins with the startling assertion that
there are "definite points of contact between Wordsworth and the tradition of
Dryden, Pope, andjohnson" (4). No one would expect Wordsworth to exhibit
nostalgia for the faded Jacobite cause in the 1790s (although many Jacobite
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poems and songs date from the century after Culloden), but Descriptive Sketches
(1793) displays his "revolutionary sentiment" in language strikingly appropriate
to Mr. Erskine-Hill's case. This case has become clear long before the final
chapters on Wordsworth because the central contention is that the poetry of
political opposition, with the Dryden of the 1690s at its root, was characterized
by obliquity, ambiguity, and paradox. The "great Jacobite theme, illegal
conquest," (40) is thus woven into the subtle fabric of a diverse body of poetry
that exploits classic Jacobite images of rape, torture, restoration, and honor. At
the heart of Mr. Erskine-Hill's enterprise is his welcome insistence on reading
the poetry as poetry; "If political analysis of poetry is going to ignore what
poetry does, then it will not take us very far. Literary and political analysis
must find a way of working together" (126). Anchoring his work in the waters
of "proximate historical evidence" (5), Mr. Erskine-Hill appreciates poetic
structures, recognizes nuances and the implications even of italic type, and reads
neglected texts. For that matter, he reads neglected footnotes. Trawling for
"the small print of Jacobite innuendo" (122) can produce huge catches.
The accumulation of the tiniest nuances—such as the details in the game
of ombre—"warn[s] the reader approaching the climactic action" of The Rape
of the Lock "that this act can be seen in a political light" (78). With attention to
another minute detail, Mr. Erskine-Hill shows what a difference Pope made to
the poem when he added Clarissa's speech and pretended in 1717 that it had
been there since the first printing, that is, "prior to the 1715 Jacobite rising"
(93). Warburton in 1751, not Pope in 1717, wanted us to believe that the added
lines were intended to "open more clearly the MORAL of the poem." The speech
makes the 1717 text of the poem "politically unexceptionable,at first sight" and
yet "does not abandon the logic" of the 1714 poem. The ambiguities that this
generates are part of "the qualified optimism of Pope's final comic balance," but
they also point to denial of the Baron's triumph, while denying Belinda "the
restoration of what she so prizes." The poem thus "suggests that resistance to
wrong, rapine, and conquest need not be futile or fatal, even if it fails" (93).
If Pope the Catholic, building on the legacy of Dryden the Catholic
convert, established norms for the poetry of opposition, Johnson the Anglican
nevertheless decided "to follow Pope in the late 1730s," although he could "so
easily and so much more prudently have found different models in the proHanoverian tradition of Addison and Young." Johnson's decision "is one of
the remarkable moments in the revolution of eighteenth-century political
consciousness" (4). Yet Johnson's own changing political stances make him
ambiguous—a word Mr. Erskine-Hill attaches more surprisingly to Bolingbroke. It is just as important that Johnson as a poet should opt for a Juvenalian
mode rather than Pope's Horatian mode, and that The Vanity of Human Wishes
should be "general" in the sense that its comprehensiveness assimilates "recent
historical events... to famous examples of the past." So "'Wolsey' and 'Swedish
Charles' are not covert names for Walpole and Charles Edward . . . but
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examples which cannot fail to remind of them when the poem is read in
context." The context is provided hy the succession of domestic political crises
of the 1740s, most notably Walpole's fall and the Jacobite rebellion.
The argument of this book is in the details. Significantly, Mr. ErskineHill's "detailed readings" set out to show "how a specific and detailed verbal art
in the resonant theatre of the world may call up the words of the past to judge
the present and strive to envision the future" (255). I hope I take nothing away
from the achievement of this book if I say that the chapters on Pope, rather
than those on Dryden, Johnson, and Wordsworth, are the most compelling.
Mr. Erskine-Hill's range of mastery is broad enough to encompass them all, but
it is for Pope that he has the deepest affinity. And that is how it should be, for
one of our finest Pope scholars.

*

Patrick Brantlinger, Fictions of State: Culture and Credit
in Britain, 1694-1994. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1996. Pp. xii + 291. $17.95 (paper)
Sandra Sherman, Finance and Fictionality in the Early
Eighteenth Century: Accounting for Defoe. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xii + 222.
$59.95.
Reviewed hy David Evans, Cornell College
Credit is a fiction and a paradox. Because it involves money that does not
"change hands" in any literal way, it can seem a fraud, a making of something
from nothing. Nevertheless, participants in any exchange involving credit
must, perforce, "credit" it—believe in it and grant its reality as a marker of
value—because not to do so would invite a fall into an epistemological abyss,
involving such participants in ever more unsettling inquiries into the nature,
origins, and authority of the value being negotiated. James Thompson has
recently argued in Modelsof Value: Eighteenth-Century Political Economy and the
Novel (Durham; Duke University Press, 1996) that mere paper money's status
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as bearer of value presented a severe challenge to the credulity of early
eighteenth-century culture, whose sense of money was based on the idea of its
intrinsic value. Conversely, paper money vinually announces its status as a
fiction, a displaced sign of value that lies elsewhere or, perhaps, nowhere. How
much more challenging, then, is "paper credit," which exists at one further
remove, at least, from any locus of "real" value than paper money, and is thus
in essence a representation of a representation, a kind of proto-postmodern
phenomenon of infinite regress lacking any clear origin or destination.
Credit's peculiar epistemological status and its role in the formation of
early modern Anglo-British culture lie at the center of both Patrick Brantlinger's Fictions of State and Sandra Sherman's Finance and Fictionality. Each of
these authors very productively take up questions raised by the peculiar status
of credit as real yet not real in the eighteenth century, and in Brantlinger's case
nearly to the present day. Reading these books back to back makes them
mutually illuminating and even more useful than they would be alone. Both
commence, essentially, by analyzing how English culture was unsettled in the
late seventeenth century by the foundation, in 1694, of the Bank of England,
which formalized and institutionalized the national debt. Brantlinger in
particular analyzes the challenge the national debt posed to makers of culture
in the early eighteenth century, many of whom (most conspicuously for
modern readers. Pope and Swift, whose philosopher was Bolingbroke) saw in
the debt a monster of fraudulence that marked the malign emergence of the
"moneyed interest" and the concomitant decay of the locus of "real" value, the
good solid productive land and its portable surrogate, gold (see, e.g., Brantlinger
6-7). One of the early consequences of this new indebtedness was the founding
of the South Sea Company, which, as Sherman summarizes, was in part an
effort to control short-term debt by exchanging it for stock in the Company
and its (almost entirely speculative) ventures (Sherman 16). The collapse in
South Sea stock is a well-known story, excellently summarized in Sherman's
opening chapter. Brantlinger moves this history in the direction of the national
irony underwriting his whole project in Fictions of State. "While satir
ists—especially Pope, Swift, and Gay—were busily attacking the national debt,
"stock-jobbers," and paper credit, they were deeply invested themselves because
they, along with the political nation as a whole, sought to get rich(er) through
new and apparently promisingforms of speculation. They, like their audience,
were stuck in the "tautological idea of crediting credit, that is, believing that
debt equals wealth or that a lack of substance is really substantial" (Brantlinger
60), a notion interpellated in the very system they sought to "discredit."
The time span encompassed by Brantlinger's title signifies the scope of his
ambition to adumbrate the enormously complex relationships between the
national debt, the building of the imperial nation-state, the formation of a
corresponding nationalistic ideology in the minds of the citizenry, and the way
these factors coalesce in prose fiction across the last three centuries. Central to
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his argument is the Marxian point that though money may be the "universal
commodity," exchangeable for any and all others, "it is not a thing in itselP
(Brantlinger 23), but a relentless and often dangerous fiction: "Although it
would be hyperbolic to claim that money takes the place of religion in modern
and now postmodern national cultures, money is nevertheless one of the
supreme fictions—perhaps the supreme counterfeit—on which the legitimacy
(or illegitimacy) of those cultures is based" (Brantlinger 24). This observation,
of course, has enormous ramifications at many levels, from the most personal
to the most global, articulating a culture in which money (and its necessary
concomitant, debt) is fetishized through a complex and often exploitative series
of "transubstantiat[ions]" (Brantlinger 20) into a source of national wealth,
power, and prestige. According to this reading, at the foundation of British
nationalism, imperial power, and even cultural identity lies a void that,
sporadically, makes its presence felt in the Anglo-British cultural imagination,
requiring self-contradictory, jingoistic, band-aid ameliorations: "from
[Thatcher's] standpoint, the Falklands War was a 'colossal' (even sublime) affair
that restored British national credit at home and abroad—though only weakkneed Liberals and Labourites sank so low as to believe that Britain's credit had
ever declined" (Brantlinger 238).
Brantlinger marches with surprising thoroughness across a tremendous
range of texts and history. For example, his brief reading of Gulliver's Travels
is clever and convincing, especially when he brilliantly analyzes Gulliver as a
kind of figure for the national debt of Lilliput—"is he an asset or a liability to
the government" (Brantlinger 67)? He becomes a standing army, a source of
power and a drain on resources, a domestic risk yet a tool that enables "world"
domination, as the Blefuscudians (like the Argentines two-and-a-half centuries
later) quickly learn. Brantlinger's discussion of the way philosophers of
money—Locke, Hume, Smith, Burke, and Keynes among others—treat issues
of national credit is comprehensive and helpful to his overall argument, which
is marked by an exceedingly high level of theoretical sophistication coupled to
a refreshing, pointed clarity. In short, given the immensity of the subject and
the tremendous range of materials Brantlinger treats, his achievement is
impressive and illuminating.
It is no derogation of Sandra Sherman's Finance and Fictionality tosay that
it could be taken as an enormously detailed footnote to Brantlinger's work.
The scope of Sherman's argument is much more specific: while Brantlinger
discusses dozens of writers over three centuries of British culture, Sherman
focuses sharply on that still-enigmatic figure, Daniel Defoe. Her goal is to
explore the way "Defoe's texts instantiate the homology between financial
credit and literary credibility, and engage both the discourse of emerging
capitalism and the theory and practice of fiction" (Sherman 8). The result is an
extremely interesting study, marked by some truly dazzling close readings, of
the relations between Defoe's explicitly "economic" texts (in particular The
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Compleat English Tradesman) and his more often discussed fictions, especially
Roxana. Sherman combines these works, not as traditional "background" and
"primary" texts, but as mutually informing and mutually illuminating
discourses that both engage questions of credit and credibility. According to
Sherman, Defoe's and the Tradesman's challenge was to create fictions, send
them out into the marketplace in search of profit, and yet retain a way out, a
method to escape responsibility for the products of his imagination while still
retaining the benefits deriving from his creation.
Sherman's analysis provides quite a satisfying explanation for Defoe's
legendary slipperiness as an author whose real positions are extremely difficult
to discern. For Sherman, Defoe's fictions are, like the credit that she suggests
inspired them, a kind of infinite series of self-reflexive appeals to desire coupled
with an equally infinite postponement of fulfillment. As is the case with those
other fictions, paper money and credit, if a culture believes a particular text's
"'intrinsick' worth" (Sherman 61) to lie in the gold standard of a verifiable truth
to which it refers, fiction as fiction is in trouble because it conspicuously lacks
such verifiability. Defoe articulates the nightmare vision for the maker of
fiction in Roxana, whose "credit" depends on her ability to keep her audience
within the story buying into her fictions of herself. Susan, then, becomes a
resistant reader, unwilling to let Roxana's fictions remain unverified, refusing
to submit to indeterminacy. Sherman takes Susan's resistance as a figure for "a
realization (Defoe's) that unaccountable fiction may be running out of time"
(173).
Sherman's argument thus depends on a Defoe carefully historicized to fit
into a moment when the implied contract between more-or-less realistic
novelist and novel-reader was not yet fully developed, when these parties had
yet to agree fully upon willing suspension of disbelief as a readerly strategy.
Here is where Brantlinger's and Sherman's arguments come most closely into
contact: the early eighteenth century saw the slow coalescing of this agreement,
along with a similar, but probably more materially important, agreement to
believe that the national debt and paper credit were a kind of "real" wealth. As
Brantlinger remarks, "Like credit, fetishism imagines as real what is not there;
what simultaneously annihilates and renews fetishistic illusions is the impossi
ble, unrepresentable, and therefore sublime burden of the real" (216).
Sherman's Defoe is caught in precisely the bind Brantlinger presents, since his
fictions are not "real" though they purport to be, and thus their power and
value in the marketplace resides in finding a way to create the illusion of truth,
coupled with an ultimate deniability that isolates Defoe, like Roxana, from the
accusation that he "lied." Credit is "implicate[d]... in the logic of fiction: both
produce signs without referents, ciphers with no payoff in the world of
phenomena" (Sherman 16), though both in some sense depend on a promise to
produce just such a payoff.
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Sherman presents a rich reading of a central problem for those who would
confront Defoe's fictional and quasi-fictional work such as A Journal of the
Plague Year. It would be helpful, however, if she were more forthcoming about
why Defoe (the real writer in the marketplace) felt so thoroughly compelled to
mystify his authorship: she suggests that texts known to be fictions would
generate less value in the market than those thought to be true, but surely this
alone does not sufficiently explain Defoe's energetic pursuit of deniability. She
may, for example, underestimate his overall "puritan" unease with fiction as a
kind of lying, an unease that might impel his resort to Bunyanesque strategies
such as his personification of "Lady Credit" in the Review (see Sherman 40-54
and passim). However, this is really a minor point, as the overall effect of
Finance and Fictionality is to present a challenging and, as Sherman herself
admits, "speculative" (xi) (though well-argued and generally convincing) reading
of the way Defoe's fictional texts interact with the emergent discourse of credit
as they both sought to sell themselves to an incredulous public.

*

Everett Zimmerman, The Boundaries of Fiction: History
and the Eighteenth-Century British Novel. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. vi + 250. $39.95.
Reviewed by Judith Dorn, St. Cloud State University
This book historicizes the characteristics of eighteenth-century British fiction
that poststructuralist critics formerly celebrated as self-reflexive textuality.
Zimmerman demonstrates that the novel emerged in critical response to
contemporaneous developments in historiography. Where George Levine's
1968 book of the same title. The Boundaries of Fiction, argued that the Victorian
"art" of Carlyle, Macaulay, and Newman aspired to the condition of fiction,
Everett Zimmerman proposes that "the English novel replicates the develop
ments of eighteenth-century historicism both in its valorization of 'history' as
the standard by which to judge truth and in its skepticism about the founda
tions of history" (220).
The overall design of this book does not argue a single thesis but rather
illuminates canonical works by using each chapter to juxtapose a set of texts
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that demonstrate how writers respond to the problems of evidence posed by
earlier writers. Each chapter typically studies how two or three major fictional
works interact with one another by setting them beside contemporary works
of historiography or biblical scholarship that cast their concerns with
referentiality, adequacy, and verifiability into sharp profile.
Zimmerman takes the terms "emplotment" and "trace" from Paul
Ricoeur's Time and Narrative as methods of generating insights across a wide
range of narrative structures and evidentiary procedures. These terms enable
him to study any writer's process of placing events into a meaningful sequence,
or any use of a text as a palpable remnant of the past, such as a document,
which must nevertheless be interpreted in the present. Rather than subsuming
texts under formal categories, however, Zimmerman maintains focus on the
historical unfolding of skeptical empiricism. The result of his comparisons
among texts is a finely articulated sense of the welter of "discourses" such as
analytico-referential language, allegory, or biblical typology at odds with one
another within novels of the mid-century. An introductory chapter on
"skeptical historiography" surveys empirical issues from Milton to Godwin,
then uses the work of Hans Frei to make a valuable contribution to recent
scholarship on the novel by demonstrating the relevance of biblical scholarship,
with its attention to testimony and referential meaning, to the hermeneutics of
eighteenth-century novels.
Pairing Bunyan and Defoe enables Zimmerman to arbitrate carefully
among the influential, wide-scope theories of Ian Watt, Michael McKeon, and
John Bender. His book does register a long-term development, the emergence
of analytico-referential language and attenuation of "figural," providential
discourse in the novel. Pilgrim's Progress presents artifacts from its biblical
master narrative; its narration comes across as authoritative because its narrator
observes rather than produces text. By contrast. Journal of the Plague Year
exposes the limits of the empirical by describing the process of constructing its
narrative. The recent, overwhelming present of the plague year retains its full
force because Defoe retains the enigmatic quality of the "trace" to resist the
experience's subsumption in a master narrative. Zimmerman therefore argues
against McKeon'semphasis on correlating epistemologies with social views,and
maintains that the novel's foregrounding of issues of authority counters
Bender's claim that the novel brings readers to internalize oppressive authority.
Particularly suggestive is Zimmerman's third chapter, which describes
Richardson as one of the moderns that The Taleof a Tubsatirizes, a businessman
who spins out a repetitious, self-absorbed text as a commodity. Clarissa
exemplifies the virtues that Wotton accords to the moderns, who can attain a
breadth and depth of understanding on the basis of archival knowledge. The
archive gives historians a chance to evade bondage, allowing linguistic
phenomena to themselves become objects of analysis and enabling the
philologist to explore the layerings of history and to apprehend whole
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intellectual worlds. At the same time, Richardson struggles to control the
meaning of the traces of Clarissa, to make his fictional monument documen
tary. Lovelace resembles the emptiness of The Tale ofa Tub's modern narrator.
He is "one for whom writing is not presence, nor presence any more definitive
than writing" (131). Both Richardson and Swift share a preoccupation with the
provenience of their texts. Editorial intervention foregrounds the work of
interpretation applied to documentary fragments. Richardson seeks larger
patterns of continuity in his arrangements, which Swift might critique as
contradictory and degenerative repetition.
The next chapter considers Fielding's authorial mediation in Tom Jones
between the larger patterns of meaning in narrative and their basis in specific
evidence, and Caleb Williams' critique of the sinister powers of narrative
authority: "In defining this new province of writing, then. Fielding brings
together the imitation or creation of character with its interpretation in both
fictional and historical contexts; he combines a theory of literary construction
and historical reconstruction in the interests of a fuller history than can be
provided without fiction and a truer fiction than can be provided without
history" (149). Caleb Williams explicates its own deep roots in the tyrannical
narratives it rejects, figured for example by Burke's sublime.
Sterne, Mackenzie, and Scott thematize the traces of individual memory
in fragmentary documents, to the point that the collectivities of history become
appendages of the personal. Zimmerman proposes the term "textual realism"
to describe a story's validation of its material transmission, in order to show the
evanescence of authenticity in Tristram Shandy and The Man of Feeling, whose
preoccupations with fact keep their stories from reaching the heart. The
peculiarities of these texts Zimmerman explains as responses to current heated
debates over scholarly tools for understanding the past, such as Warburton's
and Peters' dispute over whether to read Job literally or allegorically. The
novels of Scott figure in this argument as repairing the boundary between the
historical and non-historical. In concluding, Zimmerman personifies the novel
and history by describing their "struggle" with one another, maintaining a focus
on textual constructions that avoids replicating problems with empirical
projection that he finds in his subjects.

*
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Helen Deutsch, Resemblance and Disgrace: Alexander
Pope and the Deformation of Culture. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii + 273. $41.50.
Reviewed by Peter J. Connelly, Grinnell College
The title comes from Lord Hervey's and Lady Mary Wortley Montague's Verses
Address'd to the Imitator ofthe First Satire ofthe Second Book of Horace. By a Lady.
Pope's imitation of Horace is a distortion of the original, they say, as Pope
himself is a distortion of a human being, a disgraceful resemblance. But the
phrase can also refer, as Deutsch notes, to the laudatory resemblances pointed
out in the Epistle to Arhuthnot-, his coughing like Horace, for instance, a trait.
Pope reminds us, that has disgraced his betters. A title borrowed from two of
Pope's most vitriolic enemies would seem to promise a hostile book; but this
learned study, while refusing to take Pope on his own terms, acknowledges his
attempt to "fashion a self" in an unfriendly cultural milieu and teases out the
implications of such an undertaking.
The subtitle, "Deformation of Culture," has two meanings. As an
objective genitive, it refers to a deformed culture. As a subjective genitive it
refers to culture's ability to deform. Pope's influence on culture de
forms—changes—it, and the influence of his times deform him—or at least the
self that his (edited) correspondence and Horatian poems try to present.
Deutsch's project is thus to read for deformity. Her "reading for deformity"
entails a hermeneutic of suspicion, heavily influenced by cultural materialism
and feminism, and it always takes seriously Pope's long recognized duplicity,
the necessity of making a performance (as Deutsch acknowledges) for a hostile
audience. Pope never is—but only seems to be—sincere and candid.
The premise that Pope actually is himself a faulty imitation but an
inimitable original—and so is his poetry—invites us to consider how relevant
the poet's body, however deformed, is to his poetry. This indecorous insistence
is at the root of the book's audacity—and it is a fully self-conscious practice.
The notion of monstrosity outlined in Barbara Stafford's Body Criticism (1991)
provides an important theme: a monster is an unnatural originality. Its
distinctiveness is sufficient to insure that it has no successors. Pain and
caricature are its characteristics. Since much of Pope's career was given over to
translation, adaptation, and imitation; and since at the same time he has clearly
been original enough to have no successors; and since he spent most of his life
in pain, Deutsch is using a promising template.
She pointsout that earlier commentators suppress or neglect opportunities
to notice Pope's body. She observes that the polite avoidance of Pope's
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deformity as practiced by recent commentators is an avoidance of the game
Pope is playing with us: his "spots" (to use his metaphor) are the deformities
that authenticate the portrait. Others she reminds us, from Johnson, to
Empson and Norman Ault, have noted how Pope's physical deformity
contrasts with the formal excellence of his verse.
The result is an audacious book, one whose otherwise outrageous
suggestions are raised and supported by a library of recent scholarship, which
has at least challenged if not transformed the understanding of Pope established
a half century ago. The scholarly foundations are primarily post-structural and
Marxist; the superstmcture is feminist and cultural materialist. In addition to
the recent commentators cited—Ann Bermingham, Laura Brown,John Dixon
Hunt, Catherine Ingrassia, and Laura Stafford, to name a representative
few—the work of Paul DeMan, Steven Greenblatt, Fredric Jameson andJacques
Lacan is implicit. Accordingly, there are some assumptions that the reader
must assent to. The work assumes first and most obviously that Pope's body
cannot be forgotten. But there are more distinctively late twentieth-century
assumptions. Readers do not interpret; they appropriate. All important
oppositions are subject to deconstruction, or as Deutsch says, disruption:
oppositions associated with gender, economics, and artifice being three of the
most conspicuous, but also what Pope called "the strong antipathy of good to
bad."
There are five chapters and an introduction. The first considers Pope's
body as the "mark" of the profession of letters. The next two take up The Rape
of the Lock and Pope's garden; the last two deal with the Horatian poems.
The first chapter makes clear that Pope wants a (conceptual) distinction
between his public and private selves. Deutsch explores the impossibility of
maintaining this distinction. In a letter apologizing for not being sociable. Pope
says his study and writing will be his way of entertaining those to whom he
owes social obligations.
Thus he seeks to transcend his infirm
ities—deformities—and become his writings. But his writings with their named
names pull him back into his culturally deformed surroundings.
In the next two chapters. The Rape of the Lock and the garden and grotto
at Twickenham are seen as exercises in deformation. They miniaturize and
feminize what would be masculine cultural phenomena. The art needed to
make nature seem natural is equivalent to deformity, at least for Addison and
Sir Joshua Reynolds and Dr. Johnson. Much depends on—or antici
pates—Reynolds' observation that, even though the painter conforms to
"invariable and general ideas of nature ... he must [nevertheless] by regarding
minute particularities and accidental discriminations, deviate from the universal
rule," to which Johnson adds "and pollute his canvas with deformity" (113).
The last two chapters deal with Pope's Horatian poems, which like their
originals create, as Deutsch says, "an aesthetic that reifies the self by redefining
it as static and disembodied" (146). It is here that the latent influence of Lacan
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is most evident. Deutsch notes that Horace's readers, like Pope's readers, seem
to see rather than read their author: they create an image. But Pope, she says,
"rebels against" Horace's formal reticent and decorous verse by using imitation
to represent himself, such self-exposure deforming Horace's reticent original.
She suggests that Pope's life work was to produce the definitive version of
himself; that self's "excluded reflection, its remainder, is Pope's deformity" (27).
Lacanian values are implicit here; the remainder is the Real. To base a self on
the binary oppositions of Lacan's imaginary order is to reify a mis-recognition.
Deutsch attempts to diagnose that mis-recognition by treating Pope's textual
self properly: as a text.

*

Jonathan Lamb, The Rhetoric of Suffering: Reading the
Book of Job in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford: Claren
don Press, 1995. Pp. ix + 329. $65.00.
Reviewed by David Mazella, University of Houston
For all its pathos, the Book of Job is a story in which neither suffering nor
consolation holds an inherent moral significance. The story circles around this
problem of moral indeterminacy without ever being able to resolve it, as when
Job debates his comforters over the meaning of his suffering, and wonders why
they themselves should feel morally secure enough to offer consolation to him.
Consequently, a large part of the Book of Job is taken up with the verbal
wrangling caused by Job's demand for others to sympathize with him (e.g..Job
19: 21). In effect, he asks them to enter a moral system that is capable of
containing his senseless but deep-felt suffering. When it becomes clear,
however, that the comforters will continue to rejectJob for what they consider
to be sound moral reasons, Job begins to learn the fully paradoxical effect of his
pleas. The most self-evident and sympathizable aspect of Job~his personal,
extreme, and unmerited suffering-has, once announced publicly, made him a
target for his former friends' mockery, abuse, and blame. These interpretive
disputes overJob's moral significance, however, do not long remain within the
story's narrative frame, but quickly spread to the second-order problem of
readers' responses to Job's plight. Readers attempting to understand the reasons
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for Job's sufferings find themselves involuntarily recapitulating the heated
disputes between the patriarch and his comforters over Job's meaning.
Accordingly, the greatest strength of Jonathan Lamb's powerful new book,
Rhetoric of Suffering, which studies a number of eighteenth-century readings of
Job, resides in his ability to sustain in his own work the kinds of tensions that
he finds running throughout the story of Job. Lamb's particular interest is the
tension between the particular and the general in moral judgments, so that
"Job" becomes the figure and name for the recurrent antinomy that appears in
the form of a "conflict between the law...and those elements of a personal
history, usually painful, for which there is no prescription or parallel" (3).
The Rhetoric of Suffering explores the most famous eighteenth-century
readings and rewritings of Job (Richardson, Sterne, Goldsmith, Voltaire, but
many others as well) to discuss the multiple discursive functions of Job as text
and character in European (chiefly British) culture during this period. For
Lamb, the interest of Job stems from the contradictory status of Job himself
within official morality, as an upright man whose extravagant and unmerited
suffering flouts all general schemes of providence, society, and law. The
internal and external contradictions cutting across the biblical story at every
level allow Lamb to treat it not just as a single literary text, but as an immensely
productive "trope" generating effects throughout eighteenth-century culture.
As such, the story of Job becomes a "site of recurrent contradictions between
the norms proposed by society for its own government and the sum of
individual anomalies it accommodates and tolerates" (5). Job's very existence
stands as a challenge and a scandal to the universalist pretensions of the law,
making him in all his singularity a "surplus to the exemplary economy of
norms." In this role. Job both represents and generates a "disturbance of
representational technique [that] will bring excess into the open, and make
articulate the agitated and complaining voice of the first person singular." It is
in this concern for the quemlous and contingent voice in the first person
singular that we can recognize the strong ethical interest animating this book,
which would allow the complainer to appear without being instantly inserted
back into a moral system.
Lamb's book is divided into three sections. The first, "Stories of Job," by
far the densest and most theoretical part of the book, introduces his subject,
explains his methods, and provides his own close reading of the Job narrative
and its critical history up through the twentieth century. Here he names the
three theoretical discourses that have particularly guided his historical
investigations: the eighteenth-century discourseof the sublime; the discourse of
practice and learned ignorance as found in Bourdieu; and the discourse of
self-reference, especially in its concern with paradox and tautology, as found in
the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann (8-9). The interpretation of Job that
emerges in this section is a continual dispute between the particular and the
general, a tension allegorized by the conflicts between Job and his comforters:
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"The book of Job develops, therefore, as a contest between the universal equity
posited by the comforters, and the bare particulars of an unresolved personal
agony listed by Job" (63). The next section, "Backgrounds," describes the
recurring tensions between generals and particulars in a dizzying selection of
eighteenth-century contexts (theodicy, moral philosophy, political thought,
biblical criticism, the law, travel literature, and so on). In writings as disparate
as Pope's Essay on Man and Capt. Cook's Voyage of the Endeavour, the entry of
Job into the writing signals a point at which the writer begins to meditate upon
the gap between private suffering and public justice. The final section,
"Readings," offers more sustained literary-critical interpretations of Pope and
Blackmore, Richardson, Fielding, and, in the concluding chapter, Wordsworth.
This is a large and intellectually ambitious book that deserves a wide
audience. Lamb has assembled an impressive group of primary sources with a
theoretical sophistication rarely matched in eighteenth-century literary
criticism. There is a consistent intelligence to the interpretations of works both
familiar {Clarissa) and unfamiliar {Death-bed Scenes and Pastoral Conversations)-,
Lamb displays an enviable ability to work across a variety of discourses without
parroting received ideas. Readers should be aware, however, that the
abstraction necessary to link together the elements of this book has made it a
slow and demanding read, particularly in the first section; yet this section on
the Old Testament Job is essential for many of the book's subsequent insights.
The Rhetoric of Suffering has absorbed the intellectual breadth and ethical
concerns of some of the best new work in contemporary literary and cultural
studies, and may well stand as a model for interdisciplinary research in the
humanities for some time to come.

*
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Alexander Pettit, Illusory Consensus: Bolinghroke and the
Polemical Response to Walpole, 1730-1737. Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1997. Pp. 254. $39.50.
Reviewed by John Dussinger, University of Illinois at
Urhana-Champaign
In his introduction to Illusory Consensus, Alexander Pettit announces forthrightly his thesis: "Challenging the conclusions of scholars whose choice of
source material allows them to find ideological cohesiveness in the opposition,
I argue that the opposition was fundamentally in disagreement about how best
to formulate its objection to modern government" (16). Just as revisionists like
Linda Colley, Paul Kleber Monod, and Nicholas Rogers have questioned J. H.
Plumb's highly influential model of political stability in the Walpole era, so
after moving deftly through a thicket of mostly ignored or forgotten books,
pamphlets, sermons, plays, and other prose forms written during the print wars
of the 1730s, Pettit argues persuasively against the traditional assumptions that
the Opposition comprised a monolithic front associated with the "old Whig"
ideology spelled out by Henry St. John, Viscount Bolinghroke. Perhaps the
most invaluable service provided here is not only to demonstrate how both the
Walpolite and Bolingbrokean Opposition writers strove to convince their
immediate contemporaries of their uniform political stances but also to trace
the textual history of Bolingbroke's writings by way of showing how
twentieth-century scholars were seduced by the rhetorical ploys about
uniformity used more than two hundreds years ago.
Everything in this exemplary historical monograph of six chapters is so
tightly organized and lucidly advanced that it is not easy to determine the usual
peaks and valleys. The first chapter takes up the long shadow cast by
Bolingbroke's Remarks on the History of England (1730-1731) and the journal,
the Craftsman, which Bolinghroke dominated until his return to France in
1735. Here, Pettit explores one of the many myths spawned in this journalistic
warfare—the myth of "Saxon" liberty identified with Elizabethan England. A
major complaint that Pettit registers concerning the textual history of this
political writer is the tendency of modern reprints like Isaac Kramnick's of the
Craftsman to strip it of its local context and hence obliterate its original, highly
ephemeral and controversial impact on its first readers.
The second chapter emphasizes how Bolingbroke's concept of cyclical
history colored the political journalism on both sides, with the whole strategy
of Plutarchan parallels serving nicely both to persuade the reader that present
events happened before and more importantly to avoid prosecution while
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relying on innuendoes to insinuate criticism of both king and Parliament. Even
before Bolingbroke's departure, however, as thesecond chapter covers, the fiery
debates between the Craftsman and the Walpolite supporters tended to shrink
to squabbles over who best understood the Revolution Settlement's legacy for
a limited Protestant monarchy. In contrast to some recent British historians,
Pettit admirably resists the temptation to believe that there was a significant
undercurrent in England during the decades after 1714 for a restoration of the
Stuarts. Even if besotted Tory squires might have drunk toasts to the "King
over the Water," no people in power would risk the dire consequences of taking
such sentiments seriously. Instead, as Pettit's fourth chapter argues, the
opponents to modern government being launched by Walpole were on safer
ground simply by invoking an ideal past before the violent Civil War era.
Pettit offers proof that in the 1730s there were malcontents who were as much
alarmed by Bolingbroke's "old" Whiggism as they were of Walpole's social
revolution. Much like the non-jurors in the Williamite period, these writers
expressed what Pettit identifies as a "Carolinist" (his neologism) sentiment that
was neitherJacobite nor Bolingbrokean ideology. Rather, it was motivated by
anxiety among High Churchmen over the decline of power in the monarchy
and the rise of republicanism.
To advance the claim of this hitherto overlooked constituency of the
Opposition, the fourth and fifth chapters concern the "Carolinist" polemi
cists—especially the non-jurors Matthias Earbery and Richard Russel. Although
always informed and acute as analysis, the fifth chapter on Russel's Grub-street
Journal might have brought out more fully whether this periodical's innovative
literary contributions were influenced by its affinity with Carolinist politics.
The controversy caused by the Walpolite minister Francis Hare's King Charles
I's Day sermon instances nicely how even within the government's ranks the
notion of consensus was an illusion. Finally, the sixth chapter examines the
relative ambivalence of historical drama vis-a-vis outright polemical literature
in the years before Walpole's Licensing Act of 1737. Pettit valiantly asserts that
"many of the plays regarded as 'opposition' by (among others)John Loftis and
Robert Hume are in fact deeply anxious about the Bolingbrokean program"
(29).
This is an admirably focused monograph throughout; every page is
informative and only whets the reader's appetite for yet more and more
knowledge about the political consciousness of the Walpole years. Cavilers
may object, I suspect, that the spotlight on mainly the time of the Craftsman
until Bolingbroke's return to France in 1735 is too small. Even a glance at the
Daily Gazetteer {ram its inception in 1735 as the combined organ of Walpolite
news and propaganda suffices to show that the lively debate about historical
parallels continues on through the years just before Walpole's fall in 1742. At
least some attention to the time after Bolingbroke's self-imposed exile is due.
Sometimes it is not easy to see the forest for the trees. For instance, lurking in

380

1650-1850

all of the meticulous detail given about how Walpole failed to curb the
Craftsman's assaults on the government—and even the King—is the seed of
what later would be recognized as the right to "liberty of the press." But we
may hope that Pettit will write another volume to supplement the excellent
work here. Whatever the budget problems of libraries these days, this is a book
that no respectable institution of higher learning can afford to ignore.

Albert J. Rivero, ed,, New Essays on Samuel Richardson.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Pp. viii + 232. $45.
Reviewed by Steven R. Price, Louisiana State University
The publication of this latest collection of essays on Samuel Richardson
successfully adds to the ever-expanding commentary generated by the author's
canon. The contributors to Albert J. Rivero's collection bring impressive
credentials, including six who are currently serving as general or contributing
editors to the Clarissa Project; most of the others have written specifically
about Richardson or the eighteenth-century novel in the past. This is an
accomplished group, well-qualified to continue the dialogue encouraged by
Richardson's dynamic texts.
At first glance, the title New Essays on Samuel Richardson seems unneces
sarily vague, especially for essays characterized by their well-defined analyses of
specific issues. Rivero's short preface is similarly imprecise, briefly alluding to
the indeterminate meaning of Richardson's works in an effort to justify the
various critical approaches employed in the collection. Issues of gender are
frequently discussed in these essays, not surprising since Rivero describes
feminism as "the most important critical movement of our time" (vii). The
editor's summary of each essay is limited to a single sentence, and this
succinctness leads to misleading generalizations:for instance, Jerry C. Beasley's
important essay on Richardson's depiction of gender offers more than "an
overview of Richardson's 'girls'" (viii). While Rivero's preface is not helpful for
providing background to Richardson's canon or for bringing unity to a diverse
assortment of essays, his general comments nevertheless allow the essays
themselves to dominate the reader's attention.
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The collection opens with three essays emphasizing Richardson the
writer. In the first, Peter Sabor examines Richardson's correspondence with
Johannes Stinstra, his Dutch translator, pointing out subtle artifices in
Richardson's letters. In the second, Kevin L. Cope describes Richardson as "an
advisor, collector of advice, and editor of apophthegms" (30) and praises him for
his ability to create novels through a "patching together of incidents and
advices" (22). Next, Jerry C. Beasley provides a useful introduction to
Richardson's three novels, focusing on his treatment of gender and authority.
Beasley's discussion of major plot incidents is lucid and his discussion of Clarissa
as a most "powerful argument on behalf of a traditional model of patriarchy"
(45) is candid and compelling.
The remainder of the essays, with one exception, are loosely organized
around the individual novels. In the only essay specifically devoted to Pamela
(part II), Florian Stuber refutes the conventional view that Richardson was
"unaffected by Cervantes' influence" (53), hoping that this new context will
combat criticism of Richardson's sequel. The next six essays focus on Clarissa.
Michael F. Suarez discusses the "ambiguities and polysemous character of the
word 'child'" (73), concluding that Clarissa's family subverts her search for
personal autonomy through infantilization. John Allen Stevenson presents an
"ahistorical reading" (96) of Clarissa and suggests that Lovelace and Clarissa
interpret the world in a similar manner and that both might "hate sex . .. for
the same reasons" (86). Also concerned with sexual representations in Clarissa,
Jocelyn Harris examines Richardson's use of grotesque, classical, and porno
graphic images, and argues that for his period, Richardson's "declared
preference for the ideal and enclosed body was perfectly reasonable" (101).
Howard D. Weinbrot, in a well-documented, detailed yet clear discussion of a
complicated topic, explains how Richardson satirizes church corruption
through the letters of Elias Brand. Tom Keymer convincingly relates how Jane
Collier defended Richardson's depiction of the controversial fire scene by
arguing for "the integrity of the text and the prerogatives of the author" (156).
Joseph F. Bartolomeo, in an essay that includes a wide range of secondary
criticism, explains how Charlotte Lennox eschews the "feminine" devices of
Richardson's fiction in favor of "'masculine' techniques" such as "an omniscient
narrator, a satiric attack on the 'feminized' genre of romance and an emphasis
on humor over pathos and sentiment" (163). John A. Dussinger, balancing
speculation and creative thinking with concrete evidence, presents an engaging
analysis of Richardson's possible influence over a text of Anna Meades. The
final two essays examine the conclusion to Sir Charles Grandison. Lois A.
Chaber argues that "it deliberately subverts conventional narrative strategies
and closure for a legitimate artistic purpose" (193). Albert J. Rivero, emphasiz
ing Richardson's use of romance elements, concludes that whileRichardson was
"hoping to show that he was not writing a romance, [he] paradoxically
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encouraged his readers, both male and female, to continue to indulge their
romantic fantasies" (223).
These essays are detailed and specific enough to engage Richardsonian
scholars, but they are also accessible to readers first encountering Richardson.
Cope, Beasley, and Weinbrot, for instance, provide comprehensive historical
and thematic backgrounds to their discussions. Additionally, these essays are
characterized by informative, helpful, and complete notes. Judging from the
citations, the important works of McKillop, Doody, Eaves and Kimpel, Sale,
Castle, Warner, and so on, are not abandoned in this collection for the sake of
creating "New Essays." Instead, in the spirit of Richardson's epistolary style,
the essays in Rivero's collection build on previous writing and encourage future
contemplation. At second glance, then, the imprecise title may be appropriate.
These essays are the latest statements in the ongoing conversation surrounding
Richardson's canon, and to their credit, theyprovide the new insights necessary
for the critical discourse to continue into the future.

*

Jerry C. Beasley, Tobias Smollett, Novelist, Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1998. Pp. x + 259. $45.00.
Reviewed by Alexander Pettit, University of North Texas
Smollettians often complain that their subject has not received the attention
that he deserves. Shunned by Ian Watt and later taste-makers, the story goes,
"the learned Smelfungus" has shuffled about in the margins while Defoe,
Fielding, Richardson, and evenSterne have strutted center-stage. This rings less
true than it did before James Basker (1988), Robert Spector (1994), Aileen
Douglas (1995), and John Skinner (1996) published good books about Smollett,
and before The Works of Tobias Smollett (1988-) began issuing critically edited
texts of Smollett's work under the general editorship of Jerry Beasley. In his
own new study, Beasley renders the tired refrain anachronistic. He puts
Smollett in the main stream of eighteenth-century studies and leaves no doubt
that he belongs there.
Beasley argues that Smollett's supposed inattentiveness to form actually
masks a commitment to disjunctive narration and other experimental strategies.
The claim relies on a theoretical environment that values generic instability.

Book Reviews

383

narrative interstices, and synchronic narration. This contextual difference helps
distinguish Beasley's interests from those of Paul-Gabriel Bouce, author of the
seminal study of Smollett's novels (1976)—another attempt to defend Smollett
against the charge of sloppiness, as it happens. Invoking but never surrendering
to narratological conceits unavailable to Bouc^ Beasley finds Smollett's jarring
subordination of form to theme and style pointedly at odds with the "new
species of writing," both in its Fieldingesque and Richardsonian incarnations.
On the other hand, Smollett's experimentalism is less noticeable than Sterne's
for being cried up less by the author and his admirers (149). To accuse Smollett
of falling below the norms of contemporary novelistic practice is to miss the
point that Smollett refuted these norms, more or less systematically.
Roderick Random typifies Smollett's early fiction in presenting a
synchronic sequence of "disconnected and undifferentiated" episodes that swaps
the pretense of temporal verisimilitude for the more bracing and less conven
tional impression of an on-going present (40). Among the yields of this insight
is a reevaluation of the endings of Roderick Random, Pere^ine Pickle, and Sir
Launcelot Greaves. Rosy comic conclusions have often seemed at odds with the
narrative momentum of these novels, but from a thematic perspective the
endings function like the satirist's terminal superimposition of the "fantasy that
repudiates what is and affirms what ought to be" (70). Smollett's endings don't
complete a narrative sequence; they imagine the rectification of a world gone
wrong. Pope's moral essays might provide a good analogy.
Beasley, however, does not propose Pope or any other writer as a model
for Smollett. He claims that Smollett's disjunctiveness results from his
adaptation of non-verbal techniques of narrative and satire, particularly those
perfected by Hogarth. One should read Smollett frame by frame or episode by
episode, acknowledging that the intermediary gaps of time and space didn't
concern Smollett, as (more obviously) they didn't concern Hogarth. Smollett
had no interest in filling the gaps with the usual gestures toward continu
ity—the sort of thing that Fielding does so well in Tom Jones. Like Hogarth,
rather, he sought what we might call a grammar of juxtaposition, endeavoring
"to represent reality with extraordinary authenticity as perpetuallystartling and
visually disorienting" (172). Beasley's claim gains by being broadly apphcable
to revolutionary developments in the history of art. But the claim isn't broadly
applicable to pre-modern literary history, which is why it tells us so much
about Smollett.
The emphasis on Hogarth works splendidly in the chapter on Sir
Launcelot Greaves. The Hogarthian mode—with "every picture containing its
own narrative of disorder and disruption and all of them accumulating to create
the significance of a whole complex story" (182)—shapes Smollett's only serial
novel, the chapters of which were published in regular units at regular intervals,
like the four prints in Hogarth's election series (1755-58). By incorporating
imagery from Hogarth's prints into the chapters on provincial elections, and
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by parceling his work into unmistakably discrete units, Smollett imitated
Hogarth formally and thematically, underscoring a method that he had used
more covertly in his earlier novels.
Smollett's experimentalism is central to Beasley's reading of Ferdinand
Count Fathom. The chapter is most persuasive in its analysis of Smollett's use
of anachronism. Beasley shows that Smollett carefully established an historical
framework for the young Fathom, for example by weaving him in and out of
the campaigns of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Elsewhere, Smollett seems to revel
in inaccuracy: Fathom is mistaken for the vanquished Charles Edward Stuart
some ten years before the 1745 rebellion; in jail a few years later, his fellow
inmates include public figures from the 1740s and the 1750s. Why? Although
Smollett was "a capable historian," Beasley argues, he nonetheless exploited the
novelist's unique freedom to "invent the configuration" that contains the
particulars of history (135). Unlike Smollett the historian, Smollett the novelist
regarded the raw data of history as transportable affective devices rather than
as temporally bound phenomena. For the novelist, Beasley says, "the
imaginary facts (episodes) of a novel, like the true facts of historical narrative,
begin to take on their fullest meaning only when they are felt individu
ally—directly and with intensity" (135). This brings us back to Hogarthian
pictorialism, with its suppression of strict temporality, its generation of form
from theme, and its preference for immediacy and impact over cohesion. The
coalescence is masterful.
Humphry Clinker, famously, values formal unity in ways that the earlier
novels do not, although Beasley is quick to note that Clinker's unity is not the
unity of most eighteenth-century fictions. By sustaining five distinct and
important epistolary voices—a task more ambitious than Richardson ever
attempted, Beasley observes (185)—Smollett is able both to present the world
as "disordered" and to state "[his] faith in the capacity of people to join in the
creative act of living together harmoniously" (224). This unsentimental
accommodationism differs from the radical "displace[ments]" of closure in
Smollett's earlier novels (188) and funher distinguishes Smollett from his
contemporaries. Beasley does not press the point, but it's worth reminding
ourselves that in the comic world of the early modern novel, "disorder" and
"harmony" rise and fall oppositionally. Returning to a point that he had
introduced earlier, Beasley declares Smollett proto-modern in his formal and
thematic experimentalism (212; see also 33).
The intensity abates only in the chapter on Peregrine Pickle, a novel that
Beasley uncontroversially finds compromised by a lack of "discipline" (76). The
chapter breaks less new ground than the others but does include some fine
material on Smollett's parodic adaptations of travel literature and on his
Hogarthian character Pallet—one of the book's many trenchant readings of
individual characters. Some unevenness is hard to avoid in a study that treats
seriatim a diverse body of work; and, to adapt Beasley's evaluation of Smollett's
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uneven second novel, "[the chapter's] finest moments are such as many[critics]
.. . would be glad to claim for their own" (119).
Closely argued, clearly written, and winningly relaxed in its mastery of
its subject, this is the standard account of Smollett's novels for our time.
Coming at the end of a productive decade for Smollettians, it proves that
Smollett studies, far from being undernourished, are in blooming good health.

*

Mark Storey, Robert Southey: A Life. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997. Pp. xv + 405 pp. $39.95.
Reviewed by David Hill Radcliffe, Virginia Tech
One cannot but admire anyone undertaking a biography of Robert Southey.
The Laureate once contemplated a collected edition running to fifty volumes,
to which a biographer would need to add some five or six thousand scattered
and unindexed letters and mountains of papers and commonplace books. It
would take many years to review the books Southey read, most unknown to
modern readers. Dozens of major figures are on record about him and his
doings; he was a regular topic of discussion in newspapers and magazines for
decades. For most writers of such magnitude much of this work would have
been done by previous biographers and critics; in the case of Southey most of
the work remains to be done.
Mark Storey modestly describes Robert Southey: A Life as "an attempt to
build up a portrait of Southey"; while not a full-blown academic biography, it
makes use of the correspondence to trace the subject's comings and goings in
more detail than previous biographers. The writer's son Cuthbert first drew
upon the correspondence to give a portrait of the artist as a good Victorian, a
thoughtful, industrious family man. While not inaccurate, this view of the poet
was incomplete. Mark Storey adds the missing warts and wrinkles in the form
of the acid, intemperate, and paranoid sentiments that were an essential part of
his Tory character. This is all to the good. But other items regularly omitted
in Victorian lives and letters could just as well be omitted in a modern
biography—the boils, and flatulence, and bleeding rectums that appear ad
nauseum in Robert Southey while more imponant matters go undiscussed.
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Southey once complained that "Herrick has noticed moreold customs and
vulgar superstitions than any other of our poets, and this is almost the only
value of his verses. I question whether any other poet ever thought it worth
while to preserve so many mere scraps, and of such very trash"—this in a
commonplace book that minutely records countless such customs and
superstitions in its 3000 closely-printed, double-columned pages. Southey's
writings are criticized for their welter of detail and lack of design, nor is this
biography free from the same faults. Long, long stretches of the book consist
of numbing, unreadable concatenations of epistolary extracts and paraphrase,
six or eight undeveloped topics to a disjointed paragraph. The author and his
editors are gravely at fault for letting this pass. Random selection does not a
"portrait" make; Jack Simmons's 1948 biography manages to be both shorter
and more informative. Yet anyone with the persistence to read to the end will
be rewarded by Storey's moving and well-written account of the poet's last
years. He is good on the poetry, though the prose is less well served; since most
of us will never read the works upon which Southey's reputation rested,
quotations, summaries, and judgments would be useful. Usually the title only
is recorded, and we're back to "too many greens and too much apple pie led to
diarrhea" (154).
We can be grateful for one kind of minutiae:Storey records what Southey
was being asked to write and what he was being paid. This matters because
Robert Southey was, for forty years, the cutting edge of commercial publica
tion. He possessed that rare quality, a usually unfailing sense of how to make
money from innovative and ambitiousliterary works. While too timely to last,
Southey's lyrics and romances, reviews and anthologies, biographies and
histories were bellwether works. If he accepted money and positions from the
government, it was from choice and not necessity; his financial independence
was such that he could (and did) turn down lucrative offers. Here is more
evidence that profits were as much a part of the romantic poet's mental
furniture as mountains and moonlight.
But Mark Storey's portrait is not revisionary where I should think
revision would be most desirable: why retell the old story of a decline of
youthful enthusiasm rather than compose a new narrative of the rise of Tory
philosophy? So long as the traditional liberal view shapes his reception,
Southey's triumph as a writer must appear as an anticlimax to his early years
as a radical. In this biography thePantisocratic scheme and the Wat Tyler affair
get detailed treatment, while the Quarterly Review and the Laureateship go
largely uncontextualized. Readers need to have Southey's opinions compared
not only to those of Byron, Shelley, and Hazlitt, but to the less familiar
statements of Wilson, Gifford, and Croly. To understand whySouthey suffered
from piles, one needs to look beyond his irascible personality to the larger pain
being wrought by social liberalism. Whig history makes it all so simple!
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To treat the political and economic struggles of the 1820s in terms of the
1790s is a little like treating those of the 1990s and terms of the 1960s. Then as
now the contest that mattered was not between radicals and reactionaries but
between libertarians and social conservatives (among whom the laureate was a
major player). Mark Storey describes Southey's social thought as "confused,"
which is at once accurate and misleading. It is accurate insofar as Southey, like
most conservatives, regarded society as complex beyond the abilities of
individuals to comprehend. It is inaccurate insofar as it implies that Southey
was somehow more feeble-minded than his opponents. Profoundly read in
history, he understood the mists and muddles of social change better than most.
How could a man so well informed about other cultures and religions have
been such a bigot? How could a man who empathized so with the poor and
oppressed have defended such draconian policies? Personality and prejudice are
not, ultimately, satisfactory explanations for Southey's intellectual metamor
phosis from radical republican to Christian socialist. If anyone was at the
center of literary and political developments in the romantic era it was he; to
retrieve Robert Southey from the margins would cast new light on his epoch
and our dilemmas.

*

Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. xi +
241. $22.95.
Janine Barchas, University of Auckland
This curious history aims "to show that the footnote has a longer pedigree than
we have been accustomed to believe" (33). Yet, despite its promissory title and
opening claim, Anthony Grafton's book The Footnote: A Curious History
proves—the reader is surprised to discover—not about footnotes. The footnote,
or what he terms the historical footnote, serves the author as a convenient lens
through which to focus his discussion of the role of research methods and
documentation in historiography. His primary interest lies in the history of
source criticism as part of the professionalization of history as a discipline, not
in the history of a discreet device deployed in various facets of print culture.
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Admittedly, a complete historical study of a printed device used—and used
differently—in the scholarly writings of law, literature, theology, science, and
history is, of course, folly to attempt in a slim volume such as this. And,
indeed, the subtitle of Grafton's Curious History acknowledges the impossibihty
of all-inclusiveness from the outset by invoking the image of a cabinet of
curiosities. Grafton's subtitle suggests not an exhaustive study of the footnote,
but an intriguing miscellany of collected facts and case studies.
Grafton's case studies are arranged, somewhat confusingly, out of
chronological order. An anecdote about Edward Gibbon opens the text. Next
Grafton devotes two chapters to that spelunker of deep archival shafts,
nineteenth-century German historian Leopold van Ranke, whom Grafton dubs
"the founding father of the modern historian's craft" and credits with
pioneering modern historical research methods and the documentation of
sources (65). Then Grafton returns to the eighteenth century, to Gibbon,
Voltaire, Hume and the advocates and critics of textual criticism. The next
chapter finds him stepping further back into the Renaissance, lingering over the
career of sixteenth-century lawyer and Latinist Jacques-Auguste de Thou, who,
by annexing his academic correspondence to his historical narrative as an
appendix, turned private debate into critical gloss. Grafton then meanders
forwards through the works of several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
ecclesiastical historians and antiquarians, past Pierre Bayle's Historical and
Critical Dictionary in which "footnotes buzz with the salacious twaddle of the
Republic of Letters" (197), through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
again, before finishing with "Some Concluding Footnotes."
However, with one notable exception (namely Bayle), none of these
historians whom Grafton foregrounds in his study actually used footnotes.
Grafton makes little or no distinction between a historian's use of critical
apparatus in the form of marginal annotations, endnotes, appendixes, or
footnotes. We find out half way through, for example, that the footnotes
discussed in Gibbon "began as endnotes, and only reached what we now think
of as their traditionally prominent position of Gibbon's page after [none other
than David] Hume complained" to the publisher (103). Grafton consistently
privileges function over form because he is not interested in the phenomenol
ogy of reading above or below the line, but in the establishment of authority
within the professional discipline of history. The term "footnote" functions for
Grafton as a metonym for all types of critical apparati.
Instead of the pedigree of footnotes, Grafton documents the pedigree of
authority in historiography. In effect Grafton investigates the disciplinary
change from a note-free narrative history, in which the rhetoric of the historian
conveyed authority, to a type of history authorized by the documentation of
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primary and secondary sources consulted.^ One dominant irony of Grafton's
book is that many of the historians he discusses as progenitors of source
criticism and the use of notes, particularly de Thou, Ranke and Gibbon, were
reluctant disciples of annotation. They each preferred the uninterrupted and
seamless narratives of the old school of historians. Grafton admits that Ranke
"had footnotes forced upon him" (71). When he did insert them, he did so post
facto, as if using "a salt-shaker to add references to an already completed stew"
(65). Grafton's "curious history"is ultimately a rumination on professionalization and authority. His discussion aims to show that a historian's use of notes
reflects and refracts prevailing "methods of research and discussions of
evidence" (148).
It is lamentable that Grafton, who closes with the observation that "the
story of the footnote, finally, sheds a new light on the nature of history as a
literary enterprise," does not explore more deeply the relationship between
"literary" and"historical" usesof the footnote (231). His own evidence suggests
that historians such as Ranke (whom he presents as the pioneer of archival
exploration) adopted the methods of mentors and teachers who were,
primarily, editors and literary critics involved in the textual criticism debates
surrounding the poetry of Homer and Pindar in the eighteenth century.
Admittedly, and despite the book's historiographical focus, there are a few
pithy forays into literature. For example, Grafton's description of Alexander
Pope's footnotes in The Dunciad Variorum is rather memorable, even if
overstrained: "He used the footnote throughout as the hockey-masked villain
in an American horror film uses a chain saw; to dismember his opponents,
leaving their gory limbs scattered across the landscape" (114). One wonders
how Grafton might have compared Pope's violent use of the literary footnote
in satireto the didactic interruptions of Richardson or the Dada-esque footnotes
in Sterne, or even how today's literary critic deploys footnotes differently from
his or her colleagues in a history department. Our curiosity on these points is
not satisfied.

' One cannot read a book with this title without subjecting the historian's own footnotes to
critical scrutiny. Although faultless in scholarly detail, Grafton's 400-plus footnotes strictly
adhere to the dull paradigm of chapter and verse citation and rarely provide the hoped-for
digressive relief of which this liminal space is capable.

